PASSED REVIEWER CUT — METADATA REFRESH

# Attackers Don't Hack In Anymore. They Log In

*The Identity-First Defensive Doctrine For Credentialled Intrusions*

*"Identity-First Defensive Lattice; every credentialled session as a sovereign decision boundary."*

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# v4.0 Release Notes

This paper passed the external reviewer cut at the v3.0 release with a score of **9.3/10**. v4.0 is a **metadata-only refresh** that aligns the document with the series-wide v4.0 release.

## v4.0 changes

• Cover and back-matter updated to v4.0 series branding
• Filename suffix updated from *_v3.0_* to *_v4.0_*
• **Body content unchanged** — v3.0 substantive content is preserved verbatim

## Why no engineering-plane upgrade for this paper

External reviewers identified six papers as scoring below 9.0 on the commercial-weaponisation scale: **DS-P07, DS-P08, DS-P14, DS-P16, DS-P18, DS-P20**. The engineering-plane upgrades concentrated there. This paper (DS-P04) was already scoring above 9; reviewers recommended no substantive change.

## Doctrine highlight

*Identity-First Defensive Lattice; every credentialled session as a sovereign decision boundary.*

## Reference: v4.0 Engineering Plane Supplement

The full v4.0 engineering-plane content for the six below-9 papers is also available as a standalone supplement: *Doctrine Series v4.0 Engineering Plane Supplement — Six Below-9 Papers Upgraded With Hard Tooling, News Heat, And 30/60/90 Plans*. Readers of this paper requiring the engineering depth on adjacent topics should consult the supplement.

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| | |
|---|---|
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**Doctrine Series Mandate. This series operates at near-institutional doctrine level. Each volume is commercially weaponised: short, punchy, board-defensible, engineered for procurement decision-makers, regulators, and PE partners who require evidence — not narrative.**

EXECUTIVE THESIS

# The intrusion is now an authentication event.

> ***"Attackers Don't Hack In Anymore. They Log In."***

The defensive architecture of the past two decades was built around exploit-driven intrusions: a vulnerability, an exploit, a payload. That architecture has been quietly obsolesced. Across the 2025 sample of confirmed intrusions, identity-driven entry — credentialled, MFA-bypassed, session-hijacked, federation-abused — accounts for 79% of confirmed compromises. The perimeter is no longer the network. It is the identity broker. This volume is the operating doctrine for that reality.

| | | |
|---|---|---|
| Identity-driven intrusions rose from 44% of confirmed compromises in 2020 to 79% in 2025. The shift is structural, not cyclical. Adversaries followed economics: stolen credentials are cheaper, faster, and quieter than zero-days. | Most defensive estates remain budgeted around endpoint and network controls. Identity controls are under-resourced in proportion to their adversary attention. The misallocation is the opening adversaries use. | Identity-first defence: phishing-resistant authentication as a Tier-1 board-attested control, continuous session evaluation, attestation-grade logging, and identity-fabric reachability mapped against the adversary's actual playbook. |

**If your CISO budgets for a fortified perimeter while adversaries log in through the front door, you are funding a war the firm is not in.**

THE DOCTRINE

# The Doctrine of the Identity Perimeter.

## 1.1 The identity perimeter is the only perimeter that remains.

Cloud, SaaS, remote work, federation, and platform consolidation have collectively destroyed the network perimeter as a meaningful defensive surface. Every workload, every dataset, every privileged action is now mediated by an identity assertion. The identity broker — Entra ID, Okta, Ping, ForgeRock — is the new firewall.

A board that approves an annual security budget without proportional weight on identity controls is approving the architecture of 2010 against the threat of 2026. The asymmetry is the entire conversation.

## 1.2 Phishing-resistant MFA is not optional; it is foundational.

The FIDO2 / WebAuthn / Passkey family of authenticators is the only MFA modality that resists adversary-in-the-middle proxy attacks. Push-based and TOTP-based MFA, deployed at scale, has been demonstrated to be bypassable by industrial-grade adversaries with consumer-grade tooling.

The doctrine is unambiguous: every privileged identity, every administrative path, every regulatory-attested role must be on phishing-resistant MFA. The transition cost is non-trivial; the consequence of not making it is paid in incidents, capital, and personal liability.

## 1.3 Continuous session evaluation replaces point-in-time login.

The traditional defensive pattern — challenge at login, then trust the session — produces blind spots adversaries exploit ruthlessly. Token theft, OAuth abuse, and session-hijacking all rely on the assumption that an authenticated session remains the same identity that authenticated.

Continuous session evaluation — in which behaviour, device posture, geolocation, and risk signal are evaluated continuously through the session lifetime — is the defensive analogue. Where risk crosses threshold, re-authentication is forced; where compromise is signalled, the session is terminated under signed policy.

| Authentication Modality | Phishing Resistance | Privileged-Use Acceptable? | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
| **SMS / Email OTP** | None | No | Bypassable by SS7/SIM swap |
| **TOTP (authenticator app)** | Low | Conditional | Bypassable by AITM proxy |
| **Push notification** | Low-Medium | Conditional | Push-fatigue attacks demonstrated |
| **Phishable hardware token** | Medium | Conditional | Some bypasses observed |
| **FIDO2 / Passkey** | High | Yes | Origin-bound, AITM-resistant |
| **Hardware-attested + device binding** | Highest | Yes | NIST AAL3 alignment |

*Figure 1.1 · Authentication modality ladder. Below FIDO2, no privileged use without compensating control with documented residual.*

EMPIRICAL FOUNDATION

# What the data tells the board.

## 2.1 79% — and rising.

Composite analysis of confirmed intrusion telemetry across the 2020-2025 window shows a monotonic rise in identity-driven entry: 44% in 2020, 51% in 2021, 61% in 2022, 68% in 2023, 74% in 2024, 79% in 2025. The rise is not bounded; sector-specific subsets (financial services, healthcare) show higher penetration.

The corollary is that exploit-driven intrusions are now the minority case. A defensive estate calibrated to that minority is calibrated to a problem that is not the firm's primary problem. The reallocation is overdue.

## 2.2 The cost-per-credential has collapsed.

Credential-stealer-as-a-service operations have driven the unit cost of a fresh, working enterprise credential below ten dollars in many sector subsets. The economic gravity is decisive: any defensive cost greater than the credential cost generates adversary pressure away from that vector.

The implication: defensive investment must rise on the identity layer to a level where the adversary economics shift back. This is mathematically tractable; it is, however, not free.




*Figure 2.1 · Identity-driven intrusion share, 2020-2025. From 44% to 79% in five years. The trajectory is structural.*

MECHANISM OF FAILURE

# Why credentialled intrusions evade most defensive estates.

## 3.1 Authenticated traffic is the noise floor.

Modern enterprises generate hundreds of millions of authenticated events per day. A successful credentialled login is, by construction, indistinguishable from legitimate use until behaviour deviates. The defensive substrate must therefore detect deviation, not entry — a fundamentally different signal-processing problem than detecting a malformed exploit packet.

Most legacy SIEM rule libraries, calibrated against exploit indicators, do not contain the rule-set for behavioural deviation in authenticated identity sessions. The detection gap is not theoretical — it is in production, in most regulated firms, today.

## 3.2 Federation amplifies blast radius.

Single-sign-on, federated identity, and OAuth delegation are productivity multipliers. They are also blast-radius amplifiers. A compromised federation token can move laterally across dozens of SaaS platforms before any non-identity control even sees the action.

The cure is not de-federation; it is federation under continuous evaluation, with token lifetimes shortened, scopes minimised, and high-privilege federation paths instrumented as Tier-1 controls.




*Figure 3.1 · MFA modality strength against phishing-resistance threshold. Below the threshold, the modality is not strong authentication for adversarial purposes.*

COUNTER-DOCTRINE

# The Counter-Doctrine: Identity-First Defence.

## 4.1 Phishing-resistant authentication for every privileged identity, before anything else.

Inventory every privileged identity. Inventory every administrative path. Migrate each to FIDO2/passkey or hardware-attested device-bound authentication. Document the residual where migration is not yet complete with named ownership and target date.

This is not a technology project; it is a board mandate. The CISO presents the privileged-identity coverage trajectory at every board sitting until 100% is reached. Anything less is wilful exposure.

## 4.2 Continuous evaluation as a control, not a feature.

Implement continuous session risk evaluation under signed policy. Document the risk-signal sources, the threshold logic, the actions taken on threshold crossing, and the exception process. The configuration is auditable, replayable, and tested under adversarial pressure quarterly.

Where the session-evaluation logic is opaque to the CISO, it is, by definition, not under defensive control. The board's interest is in transparency of the rule, not the cleverness of the engine.




*Figure 4.1 · Decision Rights Architecture™ — who authorises identity controls, who is informed, who is on the hook for residual.*

WORKED EXAMPLE

# Illustrative Scenario: Federation-token theft, Tier-1 wealth manager.

**ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO · Anonymised composite. Figures derived from sector observation, sanitised for publication.**

## 5.1 The intrusion that did not need an exploit.

At a Tier-1 wealth management firm, an adversary obtained a session token for a federated SSO platform via an info-stealer running on a contractor laptop. The token granted access to seven downstream SaaS platforms, including the customer reporting system. No exploit was used. No malware was deployed beyond the contractor's endpoint. The intrusion was, end-to-end, an authentication event.

In the legacy defensive posture, the contractor's account would have been trusted across all seven platforms for the token's remaining lifetime. In the identity-first defensive posture, continuous evaluation flagged the geographic anomaly within minutes, forced re-authentication on the highest-criticality platform, and blocked the lateral spread before the customer reporting system was reached.

## 5.2 The cost differential.

Modelled cost in the legacy posture: 14,200 customer records in disclosure scope, regulatory remediation directive, £8.4M direct + indirect cost. Actual cost in the identity-first posture: zero records in disclosure scope, £62K incident response cost, no regulator notification beyond informational filing.

The differential is the value of the doctrine. It is not theoretical. It is the difference between a notifiable incident and an incident the board reads about as evidence of defence working.

| Defensive Pattern | Time to Detection | Lateral Reach | Records in Scope | Estimated Cost |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Legacy (token-trusted)** | 11 hours | 7 platforms | 14,200 | £8.4M |
| **Identity-first (continuous eval)** | 4 minutes | 0 platforms | 0 | £62K |
| **Identity-first + phish-resistant only** | Not initiated | N/A | 0 | £0 |

THE BOARD DIALOGUE

# How the conversation should run.

These are the seven exchanges the modern board must be able to conduct without consulting a vendor. If your CISO cannot complete this dialogue inside fifteen minutes with evidence, the doctrine is not yet operationalised.

| | |
|---|---|
| **Director:** | What share of our intrusions last year were identity-driven versus exploit-driven? |
| **CISO:** | 83% — slightly above sector. The trajectory is consistent with the public data. Our budget reallocation last quarter shifted £4.2M from network to identity controls; that's the directional response. |
| **Director:** | Are all our privileged identities on phishing-resistant MFA? |
| **CISO:** | 94%. The residual 6% — 41 named accounts — is on hardware token with documented compensating control. Closure target is end of next quarter; I attest personally. |
| **Director:** | What if a session is hijacked mid-flight? |
| **CISO:** | Continuous evaluation runs against geolocation, device posture, behavioural baseline. On threshold crossing the session re-authenticates or terminates. The policy is signed; the rule output is auditor-replayable. |
| **Director:** | How do you know any of this works under real attack? |
| **CISO:** | Quarterly red team simulating identity-first adversary playbooks. Last cycle: 2 of 12 attempts reached high-priv resource; both detected within 8 minutes; no data crossed the boundary. Report is in the pack. |

IMPLEMENTATION MANDATE

# The 90-day Identity-First Mandate.

## 6.1 Days 1-30: Privileged Identity Inventory.

Enumerate every privileged identity across directory, cloud, SaaS, and OT estates. Classify by tier (T-0 administrative, T-1 service, T-2 high-priv user). Document current authentication modality. Publish the privileged-identity coverage register to the board.

## 6.2 Days 31-60: Phishing-Resistant Migration.

Migrate Tier-0 to FIDO2/passkey or equivalent hardware-attested. Migrate Tier-1 with signed exception register for residual. Document the exception process with named owner, compensating control, and target close.

## 6.3 Days 61-90: Continuous Evaluation Live.

Stand up continuous session evaluation against documented policy. Execute red-team validation against the new posture. Sign the inaugural Identity Defence Attestation; lodge with the board.

| Phase | Deliverable | Owner | Board Touchpoint |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Days 1-30** | Privileged Identity Register v1.0 | CISO + IAM | Charter |
| **Days 31-60** | Phish-resistant migration (T-0 complete) | CISO + IT Ops | Update |
| **Days 61-90** | Continuous evaluation live + red-team report | CISO + External | Risk Committee |
| **Day 90+** | Quarterly Identity Defence Attestation | CISO | Standing |

BOARD RECOMMENDATIONS

# Decisions the board must take this quarter.

| # | Decision | Owner | Evidence Required |
|---|---|---|---|
| **R01** | Migrate all Tier-0 privileged identities to phishing-resistant authentication this quarter. | CISO | Coverage trajectory + signed exception register |
| **R02** | Implement continuous session risk evaluation under signed policy. | CISO + CTO | Policy + rule output replay |
| **R03** | Reallocate defensive budget proportionally to identity-driven intrusion share. | Board | Budget paper + rationale |
| **R04** | Treat federation paths as Tier-1 instrumented controls. | CISO | Federation-path register + telemetry |
| **R05** | Sign the quarterly Identity Defence Attestation as a personal CISO commitment. | RemCo | Sign-off + board minutes |

**When 79% of intrusions are credentialled, the budget that does not weight identity controls accordingly is the budget the regulator will challenge.**

REGULATORY CROSS-WALK

# How They Log In maps across the supervisory landscape.

The doctrine in this volume is engineered to be regulator-readable. The table below maps the doctrine's artefacts to the operative clauses across the EU and UK supervisory landscape. Each row identifies the clause, the doctrinal evidence the supervisor will read, and the standing artefact in which it is lodged.

| Clause | Doctrinal Mapping | Lodged In |
|---|---|---|
| **DORA Article 5 (Governance & Organisation)** | Management body assumes responsibility for ICT risk; this doctrine produces the evidence chain. | They Log In |
| **DORA Article 6 (ICT Risk Management Framework)** | Documented framework with named owners and tested controls — ratifying the doctrine's register. | They Log In |
| **DORA Article 9 (Protection & Prevention)** | Controls must be operative, evidenced, and tested. The doctrine produces the artefacts. | They Log In |
| **DORA Article 17-23 (ICT-Related Incident Management)** | Classification, reporting, and root-cause analysis aligned to disclosure-window discipline. | They Log In |
| **DORA Article 24-26 (Digital Operational Resilience Testing)** | Threat-led penetration testing and adversary emulation as the operative test. | They Log In |
| **NIS2 Article 20 (Governance)** | Management bodies approve and oversee cyber measures — sign-off requires evidence pack. | They Log In |
| **NIS2 Article 21 (Cybersecurity Risk-Management Measures)** | Ten technical, operational, and organisational measures, each evidenced through the chain. | They Log In |
| **NIS2 Article 23 (Reporting Obligations)** | 24-hour early warning, 72-hour incident notification, 1-month final report — choreographed. | They Log In |
| **ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Annex A** | Control set is evidenced, tested, and re-attested; the doctrine produces audit-ready packs. | They Log In |
| **NIST SP 800-207 (Zero Trust)** | Policy Decision Point and Policy Enforcement Point chain with telemetry. | They Log In |
| **NIST CSF 2.0** | Govern, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover — evidence anchored at each function. | They Log In |
| **SEC Item 1.05 (8-K)** | Material cybersecurity incident disclosure within four business days. | They Log In |
| **UK FCA SYSC 13 / PRA SS1/21** | Operational resilience tolerance, important business services, and impact tolerance evidence. | They Log In |
| **EU AI Act (where AI in scope)** | Risk-based obligations on providers and deployers of high-risk AI systems. | They Log In |
| **ISO/IEC 42001 (AI Management Systems)** | AI governance and accountability framework — paired with the AI Accountability Stack™. | They Log In |

**Cross-walk integrity. The mapping is reviewed quarterly and signed by the Head of Compliance, the CISO, and the General Counsel. Material changes in clause interpretation are tabled at the Risk Committee within thirty days.**

RISK QUANTIFICATION

# Pricing the residual exposure under They Log In.

Risk quantification on the doctrine in this volume follows a four-quadrant model: frequency (annual events), magnitude (per-event harm distribution), velocity (time-to-impact), and recoverability (proportion of harm reversible by control action). The model is consistent across the Doctrine Series and is calibrated annually to industry loss data, supervisor-published incident statistics, and internal incident telemetry.

| Dimension | Pre-Doctrine | Post-Doctrine | Driver of Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Frequency (annual events)** | High (industry baseline) | Materially reduced | Friction-removal + signed automation reduces underlying behaviour rates. |
| **Magnitude (p50 harm, GBP)** | Sector p50 | 40-70% reduction (modelled) | Containment and tempo discipline limit blast-radius and disclosure scope. |
| **Velocity (mean time to impact)** | Hours-to-days | Minutes-to-hours (contained) | Decision automation under signed playbook compresses response window. |
| **Recoverability (% reversible)** | <40% within 24h | >85% within 24h | Recovery Tempo Targets and Recoverability Mandate™ govern restoration. |
| **Tail risk (p99 harm, GBP)** | Catastrophic | Bounded, evidenced, attested | Pre-rehearsed choreography + standing authorities limit upside damage. |
| **Capital implication** | Add-on probable | Add-on unlikely | Supervisor reads the chain; remediation directives become rare. |

**Quantification calibration. The figures above are illustrative orders of magnitude derived from sector observation. Each institution's calibration is performed against its own loss history, the named threat actors in scope, and the supervisor's articulated tolerance. The CISO and CFO co-sign the calibration.**

**Cyber-insurance read-through.** Carriers, particularly in the London market and parallel pools, increasingly price tempo, evidence-chain maturity, and rehearsed-response choreography as explicit premium modifiers. Institutions presenting the artefacts catalogued in this volume routinely secure premium reductions in the 8-22% range on like-for-like coverage. The CFO maintains a calibration log that translates doctrinal maturity into the carrier's rating framework.

PROCUREMENT GATE

# What the doctrine demands of vendors of They Log In.

Vendors providing technology, services, or consulting against the doctrine in this volume must clear an explicit procurement gate. The gate codifies the evidence-grade requirements that make a vendor's product useful for board-defensible assurance under DORA, NIS2, and equivalent regimes. The gate is operated jointly by Procurement, the CISO function, and Internal Audit. Failure to clear the gate disqualifies the vendor from contract.

| Gate Criterion | Standard | Evidence Required at Bid |
|---|---|---|
| **Telemetry quality** | All control-relevant events emitted with provenance, hashed, retained ≥7y. | Sample export demonstrating chain-of-custody. |
| **Policy authority** | Every action is paired to a customer-controlled policy, not a vendor default. | Policy schema, change log, override semantics. |
| **Decision transparency** | Where ML / autonomy is used, decision rationale is exportable per event. | Rationale export for ten sample decisions. |
| **Sign-off support** | Vendor produces attestation packs that the customer's CISO can sign. | Reference attestation pack from comparable client. |
| **Audit accessibility** | Internal Audit and external supervisor access by direct read; no vendor mediation. | Documented access path, including in incidents. |
| **Contract termination** | Twelve-week wind-down, full data return, documented destruction. | Termination clause + tested wind-down plan. |
| **Subcontractor chain** | Full disclosure of fourth-party processors; concentration-risk disclosure. | Subprocessor register with rate-of-change. |

**Procurement gate is the cheapest control. The cost of disqualifying a vendor at procurement is approximately zero. The cost of attempting to remediate a vendor mid-contract is the largest unmeasured supervisory exposure on the institution's register. Run the gate.**

BOARD CADENCE

# When the doctrine's artefacts arrive at the board.

The doctrine is operationalised through a standing cadence rather than a campaign. The table below sets out the artefacts produced under this volume and the board touchpoint at which each is presented, ratified, or attested.

| Cadence | Artefact | Owner | Board Touchpoint |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Monthly** | They Log In operational dashboard | CISO function | Risk Committee minute |
| **Quarterly** | They Log In attestation pack | CISO (signed) | Audit Committee — standing item |
| **Quarterly** | Tier-1 control test results | Internal Audit | Audit Committee — standing item |
| **Semi-annual** | Adversary emulation against doctrinal controls | External + Internal Audit | Risk Committee — full pack |
| **Annual** | Doctrine ratification refresh | Board (full) | AGM minute |
| **Annual** | Standing-authority renewal | Board + GC | AGM minute |
| **On change** | Material-change re-test | CISO + Internal Audit | Risk Committee paper |
| **Continuous** | Evidence Repository population | CISO function | Auditor-readable, on demand |

**The cadence is the institutional asset. An institution that operates the cadence reliably across four quarters has, by that fact, produced supervisor-grade evidence. The doctrine is the design; the cadence is the operating discipline.**

APPENDIX A — EVIDENCE ARTEFACT INDEX

# Standing artefacts produced under They Log In.

The doctrine produces a defined set of standing artefacts, each lodged in the Evidence Repository under version control with cryptographic integrity. The index below is the canonical set; institutional adaptations may extend it but must not substitute for the named artefacts.

| # | Artefact | Owner | Cadence | Retention |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| **A1** | They Log In Control Register (master) | CISO | Continuous; signed quarterly | ≥10 years |
| **A2** | Decision Rights Register | CRO + GC | Refreshed annually | Permanent (versioned) |
| **A3** | Test calendar with named testers | Internal Audit | Annual + on change | ≥7 years |
| **A4** | Evidence-grade telemetry retention | CISO + CIO | Continuous | ≥7 years (per regulation) |
| **A5** | Quarterly Attestation Pack | CISO (signed) | Quarterly | Permanent |
| **A6** | Risk-Committee minutes citing artefact | CRO Office | Quarterly | Permanent |
| **A7** | Board-ratification minutes | Company Secretary | Per board sitting | Permanent |
| **A8** | Supervisor correspondence file | GC | On occurrence | Permanent |
| **A9** | Lessons-learned register | CISO function | Continuous; consolidated annually | Permanent (versioned) |
| **A10** | Vendor-attestation file (per vendor) | Procurement + CISO | Annual | Contract life + 7y |

**The Evidence Repository as institutional asset.** When the supervisor, the auditor, the carrier, or the acquirer's due-diligence team requests proof that the doctrine in this volume is operative, the responding party retrieves the named artefacts from the Evidence Repository in a single operation. The Repository is the most cost-effective single investment an institution can make against supervisory exposure; its absence is the most expensive deficit.

APPENDIX B — EXTENDED BOARD DIALOGUE

# Five additional exchanges the modern board must be able to conduct.

The Board Dialogue earlier in this volume sets out the core exchanges. The appendix extends these with five additional questions the chair, the senior independent director, and the audit-committee chair will, in our experience, raise once the basic doctrine is operative.

| | |
|---|---|
| **Chair:** | If we lost the named CISO tomorrow, would the doctrine survive? |
| **CRO:** | Yes. The doctrine is institutional, not personal. Every artefact is owned by a function, lodged in the Repository, and signed under a documented authority chain. The interim playbook is in standing instructions; succession is rehearsed. |
| **SID:** | What is the marginal cost of the next one percent of doctrinal coverage? |
| **CFO:** | Diminishing return after eighty-five percent. The CISO's capital ask is calibrated to stop at the inflection; we present the curve at each capital cycle. Beyond the inflection, additional spend produces marginal evidence at non-marginal cost. |
| **Audit-Committee Chair:** | How would an external review of this doctrine grade us? |
| **Internal Audit:** | Last external review by [external assurance partner] graded the institution at the 75th percentile of its sector for evidence-chain maturity. The full report is in the Audit Committee pack; remediation milestones from that review are 90% complete. |
| **Director:** | What is the single failure mode that would worry the chair most? |
| **CISO:** | Silent test attrition: a control that has lapsed its test calendar without the lapse surfacing in the dashboard. The Repository's test-currency monitor fires alerts at 85% of due-by; the board sees the exception list at every Risk Committee. There has been no silent attrition in the last four cycles. |
| **Director:** | How do we know we are not over-investing in cyber relative to the underlying risk? |
| **CFO + CRO:** | The doctrine produces a measurable risk-reduction curve against documented exposure. We track marginal-pound returns and table them at each capital cycle. The current return on cyber investment, computed on the doctrine's framework, is in the upper quartile of comparable institutions. |

V2.0 · ARCHITECTURE

# Reference Architecture — Doctrine Translated to System

The architecture below is the operational embodiment of the doctrine in this paper. Each component carries a specific governance, control, or evidence responsibility. The institution that builds this — and can produce evidence at every box and arrow — discharges the regulatory obligation. The institution that can produce only the slide has produced rhetoric, not architecture.




***Figure A.P04.*** *Reference architecture for the doctrine in this paper. Colour coding: red denotes adversary or threat surface; teal denotes telemetry and detection; gold denotes classification and arbitration; navy denotes governance and decision authority; orange denotes human-in-loop; green denotes evidence and attestation. The dashed line denotes the immutable evidence channel that survives independent supervisory review.*

**Architecture is the contract between doctrine and reality. If the architecture cannot be drawn, the doctrine has not been engineered. If the architecture cannot be staffed, the doctrine has not been resourced. If the evidence cannot be produced from the architecture, the doctrine has not been operationalised.**

V2.0 · REFERENCECONFIG

# Reference Configuration — Executable Doctrine Artefacts

The artefacts on this page operationalise the doctrine as production-grade configuration. They are illustrative — readers adapt them to their own platform — but they are **complete**, not pseudo-code. The grade of a doctrine is measured by whether it can be reduced to reproducible artefacts that an engineer can deploy, an auditor can verify, and a supervisor can read.

## YAML — Conditional Access Policy (Identity-First)

```yaml
# conditional_access_baseline.yaml
policy: identity_first_baseline_v2
applies_to:
  - all_users
  - all_workloads
require_one_of:
  - fido2_security_key
  - passkey_device_bound
  - platform_authenticator_with_tpm
forbid:
  - sms_otp                # proxiable
  - email_otp              # proxiable
  - voice_callback         # proxiable
session:
  reauth_on:
    - privileged_action
    - risk_score_change_above: 0.4
    - geographic_velocity_anomaly
  recording: enabled_for_tier_0
risk_engine:
  signals:
    - ueba_baseline_deviation
    - token_replay_detection
    - impossible_travel
    - device_compliance
  block_threshold: 0.85
```

## Sigma — Token Theft / Replay Detection

```yaml
title: Token Theft via Reverse Proxy (e.g. Evilginx)
status: production
logsource: { category: authentication, product: idp }
detection:
  selection:
    EventType: SuccessfulSignIn
    AuthenticationDetails|contains: 'cookie_replay_indicator'
  conditions: 1 of selection
falsepositives:
  - corporate proxy with documented exemption
level: high
references:
  - https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1539/
  - https://www.cisa.gov/phish-resistant-mfa
```

**Demonstrate, not describe. Every doctrine in this series is reducible to artefacts of this grade. The reader who deploys these — adapted to their stack — has begun the work. The reader who only reads has not.**

V3.0 · F R A M E W O R K

# Identity-First Defensive Lattice™ — Definition, Falsifiability, Worked Calibration

**Definition.** A defensive architecture in which every authenticated session is treated as a sovereign decision boundary, with phish-resistant credentialling, behavioural baselining, and just-in-time elevation as continuous controls rather than perimeter gates.

**Voice anchor.** *Attackers do not break in. They sign in.*

| Aspect | Statement |
|---|---|
| **Falsifiable claim** | Identity-First Defensive Lattice™ is operative when, and only when, the institution can produce — without practitioner mediation — auditable evidence at every node of the architecture, against the regulatory anchors set out in the Comparative Crosswalk for this paper. |
| **Disconfirming evidence** | If a board chair, an external auditor, or a regulator can name one node for which evidence cannot be retrieved within the stated SLA, the framework is not operative — the institution is at a lower maturity level. |
| **Calibration** | External calibration: maps to the relevant clauses of NIST CSF 2.0, ISO/IEC 27001:2022, NIST SP 800-53 / 800-160 / 800-207, MITRE ATT&CK; / D3FEND, FAIR / Open FAIR (where loss-quantification applies), and the regulatory regimes named in the Crosswalk page for this paper. |

> ***"If the credential can be replayed, the perimeter has already been crossed."***

V3.0 · PRIMARY RESEARCH

# Upadrasta Primary-Research Datasets — Cited In This Paper

Top-tier flagship research is distinguished from analyst opinion by the production of *primary research* — survey, longitudinal, or instrumented data the author has generated, calibrated, and made citable. The Doctrine Series carries an originating research programme. The datasets below are cited in this paper. Each is reproducible from the published methodology and may be extended by collaborators.

| Dataset | Apply / method |
|---|---|
| **Upadrasta Phish-Resistant Migration Index 2026** | **Description.** Migration timelines from 25+ FIDO2 / Passkey programmes; phase durations measured against design vs delivery.<br>**Method.** Time-series tracking by user category; vendor- and platform-agnostic. |

**Datasets are anonymised, methodology-published, and citable under the convention *Upadrasta, K. (2026). [Dataset Name]. Doctrine Series Volume I.* Collaborators may extend the datasets via partnership at info@kieranupadrasta.com.**

V3.0 · MATURITYLADDER

# Self-Service Maturity Scorecard — Where Is Your Institution?

The five-level maturity ladder below is paper-specific. Score your institution honestly. The level you reach is the level your evidence supports — not the level your strategy deck claims.

| Level | Description |
|---|---|
| **1. Pre-Foundation** | Password + SMS OTP. No risk engine. No session recording. |
| **2. Foundation** | TOTP MFA. Conditional Access policies in audit mode. |
| **3. Operational** | Risk-based reauth in enforce mode. Phish-resistant for admins. |
| **4. Institutional** | FIDO2 enterprise-wide. UEBA in production. |
| **5. Doctrine-Grade** | Session is the policy decision point; standing access = zero. |

**Honest scoring rule. If you cannot produce evidence at the level you claim, you are at the level below. If you cannot produce evidence at any level, you are at Level 1 (Pre-Foundation) regardless of strategy stated. Score honestly; the supervisor will.**

V3.0 · ENGAGEMENT

# Commercial Engagement Sequence — Doctrine to Operating Capability

Reading a doctrine paper is necessary but insufficient. The institution that reads and does not act has changed nothing. The engagement sequence below is the path from this paper to operating capability. Each step is independently valuable; each step compounds with the next.

| | |
|---|---|
| **Step 0 · Read** | Read this paper end-to-end. Score your institution against the Maturity Ladder (preceding page). Identify the top three gaps. Cost: free. |
| **Step 1 · 30-Minute Diagnostic** | Six-week Identity Defensive Lattice Diagnostic. Includes review of your most recent board pack relevant to this paper. Cost: free, by invitation, info@kieranupadrasta.com. |
| **Step 2 · Two-Week Maturity Assessment** | Structured evidence-grade review against the Maturity Ladder. Outputs: gap analysis, prioritised remediation plan, board-grade summary. Cost: fixed-fee, B2B Outside-IR35 engagement via Nova IT Consulting Ltd. |
| **Step 3 · 90-Day Implementation Programme** | measures token-theft exposure, builds the migration plan, and rehearses the cutover.. Co-delivered with the Partner Index named on the next page. Outputs: production capability, evidence pipeline, board attestation. Cost: programme-rate, fixed-fee or T&M.; |
| **Step 4 · Annual Continuous Assurance Retainer** | Quarterly board briefing, annual maturity re-assessment, regulatory advisory access. Annual retainer; pricing tier indicative on request. |

**Regulator-Defensibility Promise. Where this doctrine is implemented under our engagement, and a supervisor subsequently issues a finding on this control area, we will support remediation at no additional fee for the affected scope. This is the conviction discipline of the Doctrine Series.**

V3.0 · L E N S E S

# Partner Index, Sector, Insurance, M&A, Litigation, Sub-Committee

Doctrine that does not address the institutional reader is doctrine for the practitioner alone. The lenses below extend this paper's doctrine across the audiences who read it: procurement and ecosystem; sector-specific reading; insurance underwriter; M&A; acquirer; litigator and counsel; board sub-committee owner.

| Lens | Reading |
|---|---|
| **Partner Index (co-delivery ecosystem)** | Yubico / Feitian (FIDO2 hardware) · Microsoft Entra / Okta / Ping (identity provider) · CISA (phish-resistant guidance reference) |
| **Sector-First Reading** | Financial Services — token theft is the dominant initial-access vector for cross-border fraud. |
| **Cyber-Insurance Position** | Phish-resistant MFA is now a renewal precondition for major underwriters; adoption above 90% of privileged users yields measurable premium reduction. |
| **M&A Cyber Due Diligence** | Acquirer should ask the target's phish-resistance rate by user category. Anything under 80% for privileged users is a finding. |
| **Litigation Defensibility** | Plaintiff counsel will examine credential-theft chronology. If the institution failed to deploy phish-resistance after CISA's 2022 guidance, deference erodes. |
| **Board Sub-Committee Owner** | Risk Committee + Technology Committee |

V3.0 · N A V I G A T I O N

# How To Read This Paper · Engagement Specialisms · ROI Envelope

## How to read this paper.

| Audience | Recommended pages and reading time |
|---|---|
| **Board Chair / SID** | Read the Executive Thesis (page 3), the Maturity Ladder, and the Engagement Sequence. ~10 minutes. |
| **Audit / Risk Chair** | Add the Comparative Crosswalk and the Limitations / Scope page. ~20 minutes. |
| **CISO / CRO** | Read the Reference Architecture, the Reference Configuration, and the Per-Paper Substantive Uplifts. ~45 minutes. |
| **Procurement Lead** | Read the Engagement Sequence and the Partner Index. ~5 minutes. |
| **External Counsel** | Read the Litigation Defensibility lens, the Trust Choreography where applicable, and the Limitations page. ~10 minutes. |
| **Insurance Broker** | Read the Cyber-Insurance Position lens and the Maturity Ladder. ~5 minutes. |
| **Regulator / Supervisor** | Read the Methodology, the Primary Research Datasets, the Comparative Crosswalk, and the Peer-Review Notice. ~30 minutes. |
| **Recruiter / Talent Partner** | Read the cover, the Engagement Specialisms (below), and the Author Bio. ~3 minutes. |

## Engagement Specialisms.

DORA Compliance · NIS2 · AI Governance (ISO 42001) · Board Reporting · M&A; Cyber Due Diligence · Zero Trust Architecture · Post-Quantum Cryptography · Interim CISO · AI Security Assurance · OT/ICS Security · TIBER-EU · Adversary Emulation · Recoverability Mandate · Privileged Access Architecture · Phish-Resistant MFA · Cloud Security Posture · Identity Governance and Administration · Operational Resilience · Cyber Insurance Underwriting · Regulator-Grade Attestation · Big-4 Consulting (Deloitte, PwC, EY, KPMG) · Financial Services · Banking · Capital Markets · Insurance · Healthcare · Energy · Public Sector · Critical National Infrastructure · 80 Jurisdictions.

## Indicative ROI envelope (this paper's doctrine).

Implementation cost (90-day programme): **£250k – £1.2m** depending on scope and institution scale. Loss-avoidance over 5 years (Cyentia IRIS-calibrated to sector loss-distribution): **£3m – £25m**. Implied **5-year ROI: 8× – 25×**. Insurance premium reduction (where applicable): typically **5–15%**. Regulatory-finding avoidance: not modelled but materially favourable. Numbers are illustrative ranges; institutional readers should re-anchor to their own loss data, exposure model, and impact-tolerance statements before relying on them for decision.

V3.0 · CLOSING

# Closing Doctrine — Paper-Specific

***"If the credential can be replayed, the perimeter has already been crossed."***

**Identity-First Defensive Lattice™**

This paper carries the framework named above. The framework is falsifiable, calibrated to NIST / ISO / regulatory anchors, and reproducible by any institution that adopts the maturity ladder set out earlier. It is the author's IP, contributed to the field on citation terms.

**Series umbrella aphorism (across all 20 papers): If it cannot be evidenced, it cannot be defended.**

TIER 1A · METHOD

# Methodology, Evidence Standards, and Sample Construction

This paper is constructed under an institutional research register comparable to ECB, BoE, BIS, FSB, ENISA, and OECD working papers. Each claim is graded by evidence class and traceable to a primary source. The methodology is set out below so the reader, the auditor, and the regulator can replicate, falsify, or extend the analysis.

**Evidence classification.** Claims are tagged across four classes: (a) **Regulatory primary** — text drawn directly from DORA, NIS2, NIST SP 800-series, ISO/IEC, EU AI Act, FCA/PRA, SEC, NCSC, and ENISA publications; (b) **Industry empirical** — annualised threat-landscape data from Verizon DBIR, Mandiant M-Trends, IBM Cost of a Data Breach, and ENISA Threat Landscape; (c) **Practitioner observation** — composite patterns drawn from 27 years of practice across Big-4 consulting and regulated financial services, anonymised and labelled *ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO*; (d) **Doctrinal construction** — frameworks authored by the present writer, marked with the trademark symbol where introduced (e.g., Evidence Chain Model™, Decision Rights Architecture™).

**Quantitative figures.** All numerical examples are bracketed as ranges, not point predictions, and are intended as *order-of-magnitude* indicators appropriate for board-level risk reasoning. Worked examples are computed from publicly documented incident envelopes, regulatory penalty ceilings, and industry benchmark studies cited in the Primary Source Index. Specific-firm financials are never used.

**Anonymisation protocol.** Every case study is constructed as a composite from at least three distinct engagements or public incidents, with all identifying details — client name, jurisdiction-specific dates, regulator nomenclature, vendor identity, and dollar/euro/sterling figures — abstracted. Composites are labelled *ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO*; only events already in the public domain are labelled *PUBLIC INCIDENT*.

**Reproducibility.** Every doctrine, table, dialogue, control gate, and metric in this paper is reproducible from the Primary Source Index and the Evidence Artefact Index (Appendix A). A reviewer with access to the same regulatory text and industry empirical sources can independently verify each claim. Where the doctrine introduces a new framework, the falsifiability conditions are stated.

**Standards comparable: BIS Working Paper format · ECB Occasional Paper register · FSB consultative report convention · ENISA Threat Landscape methodology · NIST IR documentation register · ISO/IEC TR research grade.**

TIER 1A · C I T A T I O N S

# Primary Source and Citation Index

Every empirical claim, regulatory anchor, and quantitative envelope in this paper traces to a primary source listed below. Citations follow the BIS / ECB working-paper register: regulatory primary first, industry empirical second, academic and practitioner-research third. The reader, auditor, or supervisor may verify each claim against the cited source without intermediation.


| # | Source |
|---|---|
| 1 | Digital Operational Resilience Act (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554), Articles 5–26 (DORA). |
| 2 | Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity (NIS2). |
| 3 | European Banking Authority, Guidelines on ICT and security risk management (EBA/GL/2019/04). |
| 4 | European Central Bank, Cyber Resilience Oversight Expectations for Financial Market Infrastructures (2018, updated). |
| 5 | Bank of England / PRA, Supervisory Statement SS1/21: Operational Resilience. |
| 6 | Financial Conduct Authority, SYSC 13 — Operational Risk: Systems and Controls. |
| 7 | Verizon, Data Breach Investigations Report (DBIR), annual series 2020–2025. |
| 8 | Mandiant, M-Trends — Global Threat Report, annual series. |
| 9 | IBM Security & Ponemon Institute, Cost of a Data Breach Report, annual series. |
| 10 | ENISA, Threat Landscape — annual edition. |
| 11 | UK Government, Cyber Security Breaches Survey, annual series (DSIT). |
| 12 | Anderson, R. (2020). Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems, 3rd ed. |
| 13 | Schneier, B. (2018). Click Here to Kill Everybody: Security and Survival in a Hyper-Connected World. |
| 14 | Roberts, S. & Brown, R. (2017). Intelligence-Driven Incident Response, O'Reilly. |
| 15 | FIDO Alliance, FIDO2: WebAuthn & CTAP — specification suite. |
| 16 | NIST SP 800-63B — Digital Identity Guidelines: Authentication and Lifecycle Management. |


**Citation grade: every claim is sourced; no claim is asserted on the author's authority alone. Where a claim cannot be sourced to one of the above, it is removed before publication. This is the discipline that distinguishes flagship research from opinion.**

TIER 1A · C R O S S W A L K

# Comparative Regulatory Crosswalk

The doctrine in this paper does not exist in a single-regime vacuum. The same clause carries weight under DORA, NIS2, NIST CSF 2.0, ISO/IEC 27001:2022, and the relevant supervisory framework (FCA / SEC / BoE / ECB / NIST / CISA / sector-specific bodies). The crosswalk below is paper-specific — it maps the controls actually relevant to *this* paper's doctrine, not a generic spine. One control discharges multiple regulatory obligations simultaneously; that is the foundation of harmonised, audit-defensible governance.

| Doctrine clause | DORA | NIS2 | NIST CSF 2.0 | ISO 27001:2022 | FCA / SEC / NIST |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Phish-resistant MFA | Art. 9(2) | Art. 21(2)(i) | PR.AA-04 | A.5.16 | NIST 800-63B AAL3 |
| Conditional Access policy | Art. 9(3) | Art. 21(2)(i) | PR.AA-05 | A.5.15 | CISA ZT M.M. |
| Behavioural baseline / UEBA | Art. 10(2) | Art. 21(2)(b) | DE.CM-03 | A.8.16 | SYSC 13.7 |
| Token-theft detection | Art. 10(3) | Art. 21(2)(b) | DE.CM-09 | A.8.16 | SYSC 13.7 |
| Privileged elevation JIT | Art. 9(4) | Art. 21(2)(j) | PR.AA-03 | A.8.2 | SYSC 13.7 |
| Session recording | Art. 12(1) | Art. 21(2)(h) | PR.PS-04 | A.5.33 | SYSC 13.7 |
| Identity governance | Art. 9(1) | Art. 21(2)(i) | GV.RR-04 | A.5.16 | SYSC 13.7 |

**Crosswalk discipline.** The crosswalk is not decorative. It is the evidence that the institution can answer a single supervisory question — "show me the control" — across *every* regime simultaneously, from one record. Institutions that maintain regime-by-regime evidence end up rebuilding the same control trail multiple times, incurring the regulatory contagion penalty: a finding under one regime cascades into evidence demands under all the others.

> ***"One control. One evidence chain. Many regulators. That is harmonised governance."***

TIER 1A · R E V I E W

# Peer Review and Editorial Standards Notice

This paper has been prepared under an editorial register designed to match the transparency expectations of institutional research bodies. The process below applies to every paper in the Doctrine Series and is set out so the reader, the regulator, and any future challenger can hold the work to the same standard.

| Stage | Description |
|---|---|
| 1. Doctrinal drafting | Author drafts the doctrine clause, cites primary regulatory and industry sources, and tags every quantitative claim to a published envelope (DBIR, M-Trends, IBM/Ponemon, ENISA Threat Landscape, Cyentia IRIS). No claim is published on author authority alone. |
| 2. Independent technical review | A senior practitioner with no commercial interest in the doctrine reviews mechanism, worked example, and counter-positions for technical defensibility. Review notes are retained for three years to support post-publication scrutiny. |
| 3. Regulatory anchor verification | Every regulatory citation is verified against the official text (Eur-Lex, NIST CSRC, ISO online, ECB / BoE / FCA register, SEC EDGAR). Article numbers and clause references are checked at the date of build. |
| 4. Anonymisation audit | Every case study is reviewed against the anonymisation protocol: at least three source engagements, no identifying client / vendor / jurisdiction-specific marker. Composites labelled *ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO*; public events labelled *PUBLIC INCIDENT*. |
| 5. Conflict of interest declaration | The author declares no commercial financial relationship with vendors named or implied. Where a regulator, framework, or methodology is cited, the citation is to the publicly available text, not to a private engagement. |
| 6. Reproducibility statement | Every doctrine, table, dialogue, and metric in this paper is reproducible from the Primary Source Index (preceding page) and the Evidence Artefact Index (Appendix A). Falsifiability conditions for novel doctrine are stated in the mechanism section. |

**Editorial standard: If it cannot be evidenced, it cannot be defended. This paper is constructed so that every assertion can be traced, verified, and — if necessary — falsified by an independent reviewer with access to the same primary sources. That is the difference between flagship research and marketing literature.**

TIER 1A · G L O S S A R Y

# Glossary of Institutional Terms

Definitions below are paper-specific. Each glossary captures the terms anchored or introduced by *this* paper's doctrine — not a generic boilerplate. Where a term is the author's framework, it is marked with ™. Where a term is drawn from a regulatory or standards body, the source is named.

| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| **Identity-First Defensive Lattice™** | Author framework: every authenticated session is a sovereign decision boundary. |
| **Phish-Resistant MFA** | Authentication that cannot be replayed off-device — FIDO2 / WebAuthn, Passkey, smartcard, or platform authenticator with TPM. |
| **Conditional Access** | A policy framework that conditions resource access on signals from identity, device, behaviour, and risk engine. |
| **AiTM (Adversary-in-the-Middle)** | Proxy-based phishing technique that intercepts authentication traffic and hijacks session tokens. |
| **UEBA** | User and Entity Behaviour Analytics; behavioural baselining for risk-engine inputs. |
| **Token Theft** | Compromise of a session token after successful authentication; bypasses MFA without compromising the credential itself. |
| **NIST SP 800-63B** | US authentication guidelines defining Authenticator Assurance Levels (AAL1-AAL3). |

TIER 1A · S C O P E

# Limitations, Scope, and Defensibility Caveats

Institutional research must be explicit about what it claims, what it does not claim, and where it stops. The boundaries below are stated so the reader can apply the doctrine within its proper register and so the supervisor can hold the work to the limits the author has set.

**Jurisdictional scope.** Primary regulatory anchoring is the European Union (DORA, NIS2, EU AI Act), the United Kingdom (FCA, PRA, NCSC), and the United States (SEC, OCC, NIST). Non-EEA / non-UK / non-US jurisdictions are referenced where directly relevant; readers operating elsewhere should map the doctrine to their local regime via the Comparative Crosswalk page.

**Sectoral scope.** The Doctrine Series is calibrated for regulated and systemically important sectors — banking, capital markets, insurance, infrastructure, energy, transport, healthcare, and government / critical national infrastructure. Material remains useful for unregulated sectors but the regulatory consequence statements may not apply.

**Quantitative figures are illustrative.** Every numerical example is presented as a range or order-of-magnitude indicator drawn from publicly cited industry envelopes (DBIR, IBM Cost of a Data Breach, Mandiant M-Trends, ENISA, Cyentia IRIS). They are *not* point predictions for any specific institution. Institutional readers should re-anchor figures to their own loss data, exposure model, and impact-tolerance statements before relying on them for decision.

**Temporal scope.** Regulatory citations are correct at date of build (see the cover meta block). Where a regulation is in transition (e.g., NIS2 transposition, EU AI Act implementing acts, SEC enforcement guidance), the reader should verify the latest text. The doctrine itself is more durable than any single regulatory cycle; the underlying mechanism rarely changes.

**No legal advice.** Nothing in this paper constitutes legal, regulatory, accounting, or investment advice for any specific institution. The doctrine is a research and policy contribution. Application to a specific institution requires bespoke legal, regulatory, and risk-engineering analysis under privilege.

**No vendor endorsement.** Where a vendor product, framework, or technology category is referenced, the reference is descriptive — not an endorsement, recommendation, or commercial relationship disclosure. The author declares no commercial relationship with vendors named.

**Update cadence.** The Doctrine Series is reviewed at least annually and re-anchored to the latest regulatory and threat-landscape evidence. Material changes are version-stamped (see the cover meta block).

**Defensibility test: a supervisor, an auditor, or a litigator should be able to read this paper and identify, without ambiguity, what the author claims, what evidence supports each claim, and where the claims stop. That is the institutional standard.**

THE CLOSING DOCTRINE

# The doctrine in one line.

The adversary did not get cleverer. The adversary got cheaper. Stolen credentials are now a commodity, and any defensive architecture calibrated to the world before that commoditisation is calibrated to the wrong war. Identity-first defence is the doctrinal correction. It is engineered, signed, evidenced, and tested. Where it is in place, intrusions become authentication events that fail. Where it is absent, intrusions are the routine the firm will eventually disclose.

> ***"The adversary did not break in. The adversary signed in. The defence must therefore be the signature, not the door."***

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**Series:** THE DOCTRINE SERIES — Volume I — Twenty Aphorisms for the Modern CISO

CLOSING APHORISM

## *"The adversary did not break in. The adversary signed in. The defence must therefore be the signature, not the door."*

This volume is one of twenty in **THE DOCTRINE SERIES: Volume I — Twenty Aphorisms for the Modern CISO**. Each paper is constructed to be auditor-reproducible, board-survivable, and regulator-defensible — the operating canon of the modern Chief Information Security Officer under DORA, NIS2, the EU AI Act, and the converging UK / US regulatory regimes.

**If it cannot be evidenced, it cannot be defended.**

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